The following is a selection of my recent academic publications. For a full and up-to-date listing, check my profile on PhilPapers.
"Assertion and Transparent Self-Knowledge", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2019 -- co-authored with Eric Marcus, arguing that honesty in assertion requires transparent self-knowledge of one's belief
"Are Perspectival Shapes Seen or Imagined? An Experimental Approach", forthcoming in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences -- co-authored with Assaf Weksler, proposing a way to test empirically whether perspectival shapes are part of visual experience
"Intending Is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism", Analytic Philosophy, 2018 -- co-authored with Beri Marušić, winner of 2017 Marc Sanders Prize in the Philosophy of Mind
"Puzzling Identities" -- a lengthy (3,600-word) review for Mind of a recent book by Vincent Descombes
"Self-Knowledge and its Limits", Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2018 -- a critical notice of two recent books on self-knowledge and agency by John Doris and Quassim Cassam
"Understanding 'Practical Knowledge'", Philosophers' Imprint, 2015 -- on what Anscombe means when she writes in Intention of our "practical knowledge" of our actions
"Conscious Vision in Action" (with Robert Briscoe), Cognitive Science, 2015 -- against a popular interpretation of the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis, and in defense of the idea that we consciously control our actions
"Vision, Self-Location, and the Phenomenology of the 'Point of View'", Noûs, 2014 -- argues that visual experience is explicitly "self-locating"
"Do Things Look the Way They Feel?", Analysis, 2013 -- on the Molyneux question, and why recent research by Held and colleagues is not enough to answer it
"Does Visual Spatial Awareness Require the Visual Awareness of Space?", Mind & Language, 2012 -- asks the question posed in the title and answers, on the basis of empirical evidence, that perhaps not
"Assertion and Transparent Self-Knowledge", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2019 -- co-authored with Eric Marcus, arguing that honesty in assertion requires transparent self-knowledge of one's belief
"Are Perspectival Shapes Seen or Imagined? An Experimental Approach", forthcoming in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences -- co-authored with Assaf Weksler, proposing a way to test empirically whether perspectival shapes are part of visual experience
"Intending Is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism", Analytic Philosophy, 2018 -- co-authored with Beri Marušić, winner of 2017 Marc Sanders Prize in the Philosophy of Mind
"Puzzling Identities" -- a lengthy (3,600-word) review for Mind of a recent book by Vincent Descombes
"Self-Knowledge and its Limits", Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2018 -- a critical notice of two recent books on self-knowledge and agency by John Doris and Quassim Cassam
"Understanding 'Practical Knowledge'", Philosophers' Imprint, 2015 -- on what Anscombe means when she writes in Intention of our "practical knowledge" of our actions
"Conscious Vision in Action" (with Robert Briscoe), Cognitive Science, 2015 -- against a popular interpretation of the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis, and in defense of the idea that we consciously control our actions
"Vision, Self-Location, and the Phenomenology of the 'Point of View'", Noûs, 2014 -- argues that visual experience is explicitly "self-locating"
"Do Things Look the Way They Feel?", Analysis, 2013 -- on the Molyneux question, and why recent research by Held and colleagues is not enough to answer it
"Does Visual Spatial Awareness Require the Visual Awareness of Space?", Mind & Language, 2012 -- asks the question posed in the title and answers, on the basis of empirical evidence, that perhaps not
